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Abstract—The main goal of this study is to investigate the ro-
bustness of graph-based Deep Learning (DL) models used for In-
ternet of Things (IoT) malware classification against Adversarial
Learning (AL). We designed two approaches to craft adversarial
IoT software, including Off-the-Shelf Adversarial Attack (OSAA)
methods, using six different AL attack approaches, and Graph
Embedding and Augmentation (GEA). The GEA approach aims
to preserve the functionality and practicality of the generated
adversarial sample through a careful embedding of a benign
sample to a malicious one. Our evaluations demonstrate that
OSAAs are able to achieve a misclassification rate (MR) of
100%. Moreover, we observed that the GEA approach is able
to misclassify all IoT malware samples as benign.
Index Terms—Adversarial Learning, Deep Learning, Graph
Analysis, Internet of Things, Malware Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) devices, including sensors, voice
assistants, automation tools, etc. [1], are widely used, increas-
ing the attack surface of the Internet due to their evolving
and often insecure software. Thus, it is essential to understand
IoT software to address security issues through analysis and
detection [1]. However, the research work on IoT software
analysis has been very limited not only in the size of the
analyzed samples, but also the utilized approaches [2]. A
promising direction leverages a graph-theoretic approach to
analyze IoT malware. Representative static characteristics of
IoT applications can be extracted from the Control Flow
Graph (CFG), which can be utilized to build an automatic
IoT malware detection system [3].
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms, specifically DL net-
works, are actively used in a wide range of applications,
such as health-care, industry, cyber-security, and etc. [4],
[5]. However, it has been shown that ML/DL networks are
vulnerable to AL, where an adversary can force the model
to his desired output, e.g., misclassification. Although it is an
active research area, there is very little research work done
on understanding the impact of AL on DL-based IoT malware
detection system and practical implications [6], particularly
those that utilize CFG features for detection.
Goal of this study. Motivated by the aforementioned issues,
our main goal is generating adversarial IoT software samples
that (1) fool the classifier and (2) function as intended.
Approach. To tackle the above objectives, we designed two
approaches to craft adversarial examples, including OSAA
and GEA approaches. The OSAA approach incorporates six
well-known adversarial learning methods to force the model
to misclassification. Whereas, the GEA approach aims to
preserve the functionality and practicality of the generated
adversarial samples through a careful connection of benign
graph to a malicious one.
Contributions. Our contributions are as follows: 1) We exam-
ined the robustness of CFG-based deep learning IoT malware
detection system using two different approaches, including off-
the-shelf adversarial learning algorithms and graph embedding
and augmentation, while maintaining the practicality and func-
tionality of the crafted AEs. 2) We found that the first approach
can generate AEs with MR of 100%. However, they do not
guarantee the practicality and functionality of the crafted AEs,
unlike the GEA approach.
II. GENERATING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In order to generate realistic AEs that preserve the function-
ality and practicality of the original samples we design two
approaches: generic adversarial machine learning attacks and
GEA. More information regarding the proposed approaches
are presented in §II-A and §II-B.
A. Off-the-Shelf Adversarial Attacks (OSAA)
This approach incorporates well-established adversarial ma-
chine learning attack methods into IoT malware detection.
These methods apply small perturbation into the feature space
to generate AEs that lead to misclassification.
B. Graph Embedding and Augmentation (GEA)
Assume an original sample xorg and a selected target
sample xsel, our main goal is to combine the two samples
while preserving the functionality and practicality of xorg and
achieving misclassification. Prior to generating the CFG for
these algorithms, we compile the code using GNU Compiler
Collection (GCC) command. Afterwards, Radare2 is used to
extract the CFG from the binaries. 1(a) and 1(b) show the
generated graphs for xorg and xsel, respectively.
III. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
A. Dataset
We obtained the CFG dataset of the IoT malware from Alas-
mary et al. [3] to assess our proposed approach. The dataset
consists of 2,281 malicious and 276 benign IoT samples.
We extracted 23 different features in seven different groups,
including betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, degree
centrality, shortest path, density, # of edges, and # of nodes.
B. Results & Discussion
1) Deep Learning-based IoT Malware Detection System:
We designed a CNN-based classifier, which distinguishes IoT
malware samples from benign ones, trained over 23 CFG-
based features categorized in seven groups, including between-
ness centrality, closeness centrality, degree centrality, shortest
path, density, # of edges, and # of nodes, extracted from CFGs
of 2,281 malware and 276 benign samples. We achieved an
accuracy rate of 97.13% with a False Negative Rate (FNR)
of 11.26% and False Positive Rate (FPR) of 1.55%. It is
worth mentioning that the high value of FNR is due to the
imbalanced number of malware and benign samples.
2) OSAA: We implemented six generic adversarial learning
attack methods to generate AE by perturbing the feature space.
Overall, those approaches have shown, in general, a good
performance (see Table I).
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  ;-- main:
/ (fcn) sym.main 24
|   sym.main ();
| ; var int local_4h @ rbp-0x4
| 0x004004d6      push rbp
| 0x004004d7      mov rbp, rsp
| 0x004004da      mov dword [local_4h], 0
| 0x004004e1      add dword [local_4h], 1
| 0x004004e5      cmp dword [local_4h], 9
| 0x004004e9      jle 0x4004e1
| 0x004004eb      nop
| 0x004004ec      pop rbp
\ 0x004004ed      ret
(a) Original sample’s CFG
  ;-- main:
/ (fcn) sym.main 35
|   sym.main ();
| ; var int local_8h @ rbp-0x8
| ; var int local_4h @ rbp-0x4
| 0x004004d6      push rbp
| 0x004004d7      mov rbp, rsp
| 0x004004da      mov dword [local_8h], 0
| 0x004004e1      mov dword [local_4h], 0
| 0x004004e8      cmp dword [local_8h], 0
| 0x004004ec      je 0x4004f6
| 0x004004f6      nop
| 0x004004f7      pop rbp
\ 0x004004f8      ret
| 0x004004ee      mov dword [local_4h], 0xa
| 0x004004f5      nop
(b) Taraget sample’s CFG
/ (fcn) main 66
|   main ();
| ; var int local_10h @ rbp-0x10
| ; var int local_ch @ rbp-0xc
| ; var int local_8h @ rbp-0x8
| ; var int local_4h @ rbp-0x4
| 0x004004d6      push rbp
| 0x004004d7      mov rbp, rsp
| 0x004004da      mov dword [local_ch], 1
| 0x004004e1      cmp dword [local_ch], 1
| 0x004004e5      jne 0x4004fa
| 0x004004fa      mov dword [local_8h], 0
| 0x00400501      mov dword [local_4h], 0
| 0x00400508      cmp dword [local_8h], 0
| 0x0040050c      je 0x400515
| 0x004004e7      mov dword [local_10h], 0
| 0x00400515      nop
| 0x00400516      pop rbp
\ 0x00400517      ret
| 0x0040050e      mov dword [local_4h], 0xa
| 0x004004ee      add dword [local_10h], 1
| 0x004004f2      cmp dword [local_10h], 9
| 0x004004f6      jle 0x4004ee
| 0x004004f8      jmp 0x400515
(c) Crafted adversarial CFG using GEA
Fig. 1. A practical implementation of the GEA approach. Fig. 1(a) shows the generated CFG for the original sample and used for extracting graph-based
features (graph size, centralities, etc.) for graph/program classification and malware detection. 1(b) shows the graph for the selected target sample generated
as in Fig. 1(a). Finally, The generated adversarial graph using GEA approach. Note that this graph is obtained logically by embedding the graph in Fig. 1(b)
into the graph in Fig. 1(a).
TABLE I
EVALUATION OF THE GENERIC ADVERSARIAL LEARNING ATTACK
METHODS. MR: MISCLASSIFICATION RATE, AVG.FG: AVERAGE NUMBER
OF CHANGED FEATURES,AND CT: COMPUTATION TIME.
Attack Method MR (%) Avg.FG CT (ms)
C&W [7] 100 12.60 25.30
DeepFool [8] 86.39 14.90 2.56
ElasticNet [9] 100 5.42 114.18
JSMA [10] 99.80 4.00 0.78
MIM [11] 100 20.60 0.90
PGD [12] 100 22.56 2.40
TABLE II
GEA: MALWARE TO BENIGN (MAL2BEN) AND BENIGN TO MALWARE
(BEN2MAL) MISCLASSIFICATION RATE. MR: MISCLASSIFICATION RATE,
CT: COMPUTATIONAL TIME.
Size # Nodes MR (%) CT (ms)
Mal2Ben
Minimum 2 7.67 33.69
Median 24 95.48 37.79
Maximum 455 100 1,123.12
Ben2Mal
Minimum 1 30.65 40.65
Median 64 57.60 69.23
Maximum 367 88.04 473.91
3) GEA: This approach is designed to generate a practical
AE that fools the classifier, while preserving the functionality
and practicality of the original sample. Here, we discuss the
inherent overhead of the GEA approach. We investigate the
impact of the size of the graph, determined by the number
of the nodes in a graph, and graph density, determined by the
number of edges in a graph while the number of nodes is fixed.
Note that all generated samples maintain the practicality and
the functionality of the original sample. The obtained results
are discussed in more detail in the following.
Graph Size Impact. We selected three graphs, as targets, from
each of the benign and malicious IoT software, consisting of a
minimum, median and maximum graph size, and the goal was
to understand the impact of size on MR with GEA. The results
are shown in Table II. We found that the MR increases when
the number of nodes increases, which is perhaps natural. In
addition, the time needed to craft the AE is proportional to the
size of the selected sample. We achieved a malware to benign
MR of as high as 100%, and a benign to malware MR of
88.04%, while insuring that the original samples are executed
as intended, a property not guaranteed with the off-the-shelf
adversarial attack methods.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work, we generated the CFGs of the IoT samples,
we then extracted 23 representative features from the CFGs to
train our DL model. The focus of this study is to investigate
the robustness of the trained DL model. Thus, we designed
two approaches, including OSAA methods and GEA. OSAA
methods incorporates six different attacks to generate the
AE. In our evaluation, we obtain a MR of up to 100%
using these attacks. GEA approach focuses on preserving the
functionality and practicality of the generated samples, which
is not guaranteed in OSAA methods. Our evaluation showed
that GEA is able to misclassify all malware samples as benign.
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